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The South African Civil Union Act 17 of 2006: A Good
Example of the Dangers of Rushing
the Legislative
Process‡
Bradley S. Smith and J.A. Robinson
I. SETTING THE SCENE—A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
The 27th of April 1994 heralded the dawning of a new era for the
Republic of South Africa. On this date, the interim Constitution1 came
into operation and for the first time in its history the Republic was to be
governed by a democratic constitutional dispensation, which ousted
parliamentary sovereignty in favour of constitutional supremacy. The
thrust of this new era was illustrated by the preamble of the interim
Constitution which stated:
[T]here is a need to create a new order in which all South Africans will
be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign and
democratic constitutional state in which there is equality between men
and women and people of all races so that all citizens shall be able to
enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms . . . .

The cornerstone2 of this ―new order‖ was a Bill of Rights, one of the
most fundamental rights being the right to equality. The interim
‡

This paper was presented by Bradley Smith as part of a ―Symposium on Same-Sex Marriage and
Gay Adoptions: Inclusion, Compromise, Protection, and Consequences‖ on November 2, 2007, at
the J. Reuben Clark Law School on the campus of Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. It
constitutes an abridged version of Bradley S. Smith & J.A. Robinson, The South African Civil Union
Act 17 of 2006: Progressive legislation with regressive implications?, 3 INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y & FAMILY.
(forthcoming 2008). This abridged version has been published with the kind permission of the
editorial board of the latter journal. As such, this adaptation includes a number of excerpts from and
references to the original article. For the sake of completeness, readers are encouraged to refer to the
original version. The authors are greatly indebted to the editorial board of the INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y &
FAMILY for this concession.
Senior lecturer, Department of Private Law, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South
Africa. This paper forms part of an LL.D study that is currently in progress.
Professor of Private Law, University of the North West, Potchefstroom, South Africa.
1. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 (repealed 1996).
2. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 7 (repealing the interim Constitution, see infra note 1). This
section states ―[the Bill of Rights] enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.‖
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Constitution was replaced3 by the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa (―the Constitution‖), and the right to equality is currently
contained in section 9 of the Constitution. According to section 9, the
basic premise of this right is that ―[e]veryone is equal before the law and
has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.‖4 Section 9 also
states that neither the state nor any person may discriminate unfairly,
either directly or indirectly, against anyone on a number of listed
grounds,5 which include race, gender, sexual orientation, and marital
status. Discrimination on any of these listed grounds is presumed to be
unfair, unless proven otherwise.
The South African Bill of Rights also makes express provision for a
number of other fundamental rights, such as the right to life,6 the right to
human dignity,7 the right to freedom and security of the person,8 the right
to freedom of expression,9 and the right to privacy.10 The rights
contained in the Bill are, however, not absolute and may be limited in
accordance with section 36 of the Constitution (the so-called ―limitation
clause‖).11
As can be expected, the advent of a democratic constitutional order
bolstered by a comprehensive Bill of Rights had an enormous and
instantaneous impact on almost every facet of South African life, law,
and culture. One of the most dramatic and far-reaching of these was
occasioned by the newly-created Constitutional Court, which, in its
capacity as South Africa‘s highest court in all constitutional matters,
wasted no time in abolishing the death penalty in 1995.12 The legal
development of human rights in South Africa was by no means limited to
criminal law but also extended to private law and family law issues as
well. The purpose of this paper is to examine a number of legislative and
judicial developments which have occurred in South Africa since 1994
3. The interim Constitution was transitional in nature and was enacted with a view towards
the eventual promulgation of a ―final‖ Constitution, the text for which was approved on May 8,
1996. When it came into operation on February 4, 1997, this ―final‖ Constitution repealed the
interim Constitution and ―complete[d] South Africa‘s constitutional revolution.‖ IAIN CURRIE AND
JOHAN DE WAAL, THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 6 (5th ed. 2005).
4. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(1).
5. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(3). The grounds listed in section 9(3) are race, gender, sex,
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth.
6. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 11.
7. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 10 (―Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their
dignity respected and protected.‖).
8. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 12.
9. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16.
10. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 14.
11. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36.
12. S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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and to evaluate the efficacy of recent civil union legislation in light of
these developments. To this end the concept of ―marriage‖ and its
evolution will be tracked in Part II, followed by an analysis of
interpretative difficulties and other anomalous consequences occasioned
by the promulgation of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (―Civil Union
Act‖) in Parts III and IV. Finally, Part V concludes that the drafters of
the Civil Union Act paid scant regard to the comprehensive research that
had been conducted by the South African Law Reform Commission in
the decade preceding the Civil Union Act, with the result that same-sex
cohabitants are currently afforded better legal protection than their
heterosexual peers.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF MARRIAGE AND THE
CHALLENGES TO ITS STATUS AND DEFINITION
A. Marriage Under Attack
Prior to the democratic constitutional era, civil marriage (that is, a
marriage in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (―Marriage Act‖))
between two heterosexual persons was the only family form recognized
by South African law.13 Interestingly, the Marriage Act did not contain a
definition of the concept of marriage, which meant courts had to use the
common law14 to define marriage.
In Ismail v Ismail,15 the Appellate Division (which was the highest
Court in South Africa at the time) defined marriage in terms of the
common law as being ―the legally recognized voluntary union for life of
one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others while it lasts.‖
This definition shows that civil marriage was viewed and regulated from
an exclusively Westernized point of view.16 Two of the most noticeable
deficiencies of this rigid approach were (1) the blanket non-recognition
of polygynous17 marriages and (2) relationships between extra-marital

13. See SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, PROJECT 118: REPORT ON DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIPS,
xi,
3
(2006),
available
at
http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports
/r_prj118_2006march.pdf; see also Nat‘l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home
Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) ¶ 36 (S. Afr.).
14. The common law can be loosely defined as the body of law that is not found in South
African legislation and which is derived chiefly from Roman-Dutch law. H.R. HAHLO & E. KAHN,
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS BACKGROUND 132 (1968).
15. 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) at 1019 (H) (S.Afr); see also Seedat‘s Ex‘rs v The Master (Natal)
1917 A.D. 302, 309 (S. Afr.) (―With us marriage is the union of one man with one woman, to the
exclusion while it lasts of all others.‖).
16. J.A. Robinson, The Evolution of the Concept of Marriage in South Africa, 26 OBITER
488, 488–93 (2005).
17. For the purposes of South African law, it is more correct to use the term ―polygyny‖ (i.e.,
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cohabitants (both heterosexual and homosexual) received minimal legal
recognition.
The absence of legal recognition of polygynous marriages was
especially problematic as polygyny constitutes an important cultural
aspect for many indigenous black people of Southern Africa. Polygynous
marriages are also often encountered in (purely religious as opposed to
civil) marriages that have been concluded according to the Islamic faith.
This lacuna was partially addressed by the Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (―Customary Marriages Act‖) which came
into operation on December 15, 2000.18 As suggested by its title, this Act
provides for full legal recognition of marriages concluded in accordance
with customary law. ―Customary law‖ is defined by the Customary
Marriages Act as ―the customs and usages traditionally observed among
the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of
the culture of those peoples.‖19
The second problem (namely minimal legal recognition for extramarital cohabitation) manifested itself in many ways. Examples of the
differentiation between cohabitants and spouses include (i) that
cohabitants did not automatically inherit intestate from one another in the
absence of a valid will in which the survivor was benefited, (ii) that
cohabitants were not placed under any legal obligation to maintain one
another either during or after the termination of their relationship, and
(iii) that cohabitants were not subjected to (or protected by) the various
matrimonial property regimes that were available to married couples.20 In
short, the rights and duties that were attached to marriage by operation of
law21 did not apply to cohabitants unless they had contracted to this
effect or unless they were specifically included within the ambit of
legislation (a situation which was the exception rather than the rule).22

the situation where one man may be married to more than one woman simultaneously) rather than
―polygamy‖ (i.e., where one or more wife or husband is permitted simultaneously).
18. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.).
19. Id. § 1. Islamic and Hindu marriages are therefore not included within the ambit of this
Act, but the South African Law Reform Commission has prepared a draft Muslim Marriages Bill (as
part of its Project 106 Islamic Marriages and Related Matters Report) which might, in the future,
pave the way for full legal recognition of Islamic marriages. The possible recognition of these
marriages is complicated by the conflicting constitutional values of the right to freedom of religion
and the right to equality on the basis of gender. See D.S.P. CRONJÉ & JACQUELINE HEATON, SOUTH
AFRICAN FAMILY LAW, 222–223 (2d ed. 2004) (for a brief exposition of this issue).
20. See Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡.
21. These included consortium omnis vitae and its attendant rights and obligations such as
the privilege relating to marital communication which entails that although spouses are competent to
do so, they generally cannot be compelled to testify against one another. See Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977 § 195 (S. Afr.) (containing this principle and applicable exceptions).
22. An example occurs in the case of domestic violence, where the Domestic Violence Act
116 of 1998 (S. Afr.) categorically provides for domestic relationships where the persons ―[whether
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Although this rigid Calvinistic approach towards the law of marriage
dictated the course of South African family law for almost 350 years, the
coming into operation of the Bill of Rights signified impending change.
When viewed against the backdrop of the rights to equality23 and human
dignity24 as guaranteed by the then newly-adopted Constitution, it was
clear that the pre-1994 South African definition of marriage would not
pass Constitutional muster, and a more pluralistic and inclusive family
law system would be demanded of a society which subscribed to the
―democratic values of human dignity, equality, and freedom.‖25 Societal
groups that had faced a history of marginalization, such as gays and
lesbians, were quick to approach the Courts in order to challenge the
legal legacy left by pre-democratic South Africa. For example, in the
1998 decision of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v
Minister of Justice the Constitutional Court abolished the common law
crime of sodomy on the basis that it violated the rights to equality,
human dignity, and privacy.26 Two years later, in National Coalition for
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs and Another the
same Court found that section 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991
(―Aliens Control Act‖) discriminated against partners in permanent
same-sex life partnerships as it only provided for the spouses of
permanent South African residents to apply for immigration permits.27 In
consequence of this finding, the Court ordered that the words ―or partner,
in a permanent same-sex life partnership‖ would henceforth be read into
the Act after the word ―spouse‖ to remedy this defect.28
As will be seen in this paper, a number of other piecemeal
developments pertaining to same- and opposite-sex couples also took
place by way of the Courts. These developments attempted to give effect
to family law relations between unmarried couples. However, despite
these ad hoc developments, civil marriage remained an institution
reserved solely for two heterosexual persons who had elected to marry in
terms of the Marriage Act. It was therefore clear from the outset that it
they are of the same or of the opposite sex] live or lived together in a relationship in the nature of
marriage, although they are not, or were not, married to each other, or are not able to be married to
each other.‖
23. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9; see discussion supra Part I.
24. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 10.
25. Id. § 7.
26. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.).
27. 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (citing Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 § 25(5) (S. Afr.)
(stating that ―a regional committee may, upon application by the spouse or the dependent child of a
person permanently and lawfully resident in the Republic, authorize the issue of an immigration
permit‖)).
28. Nat‘l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1, 45 (CC)
(S. Afr.).

424

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 22

was only a matter of time before same-sex couples would approach the
Courts for an answer to the million dollar question as to whether or not
the law could continue to deny them the right to marry one another.
In 2002, Marié Fourie and Cecilia Bonthuys, a lesbian couple living
in Pretoria, approached the High Court for an order directing the Minister
of Home Affairs to register their marriage in terms of the Marriage Act.29
After a long and drawn-out legal battle involving a number of appeals
and cross-appeals conducted before the full spectrum of higher Courts in
South Africa, the couple eventually found themselves litigating in the
Constitutional Court—a step which would finally provide a definitive
answer to the question as to whether or not same-sex couples would be
permitted to marry one another in South Africa.30
On December 1, 2005, the Constitutional Court delivered its
judgment in the matter of Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie
and Another finding in favour of the couple and holding (i) that the
common law definition of marriage was unconstitutional to the extent
that it did not allow for same-sex couples to enjoy the rights and
obligations of marriage, and (ii) that section 30(1) of the Marriage Act
was unconstitutional to the extent that it did not provide a gender-neutral
marriage formula which could encompass same-sex marriages.31
Despite this finding, the majority of the Constitutional Court opted
not to make these orders enforceable immediately, but instead gave
Parliament a period of one year from the date of the judgment to
promulgate legislation which would remedy the deficiencies.32 If
Parliament failed to meet the deadline of November 30, 2006, the Court
held that the words ―or spouse‖ would simply be read into section 30(1)
of the Marriage Act, thereby providing a marriage formula that was wide
enough to encompass the conclusion of same-sex marriages.33 The
Legislature responded to the Fourie case by enacting the Civil Union Act
17 of 2006 (―Civil Union Act‖).

29. Fourie and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another No. 17280/02 (Transvaal
High Ct. Oct. 18, 2002) (S. Afr.) (unreported decision).
30. Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another, 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) 531–
39 (S. Afr.).
31. Id. at 584.
32. In her minority judgment, Judge O‘Regan did not disagree with the merits of Judge
Sach‘s findings, but simply felt that the declarations of invalidity should be made effective
immediately instead of being suspended for the one year period. Id. at 584–90 (O‘Regan, J.,
concurring).
33. Id. at 586.
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B. The Legislature’s Response to the Fourie Case
As seen above, the Fourie case charged the Legislature with the
unenviable task of legislating a highly contentious and emotional issue—
namely the legal regulation of same-sex marriage. The difficulty of this
assignment was clear from the start. The first Civil Union Bill attempted
to make provision for the conclusion of ―civil unions‖ without calling
these unions ―marriages.‖34 The bill provided for a ―civil union‖ to take
the form of either a ―civil partnership‖ (which could be concluded by
same-sex couples only and which would make all the legal consequences
of civil marriage available to such couples) or a ―domestic partnership‖
(which provided for the extension of certain consequences of civil
marriage to be extended to the domestic partners and was available to
either hetero- or homosexual couples).35
The use of terms such as ―civil partnership‖ was not received
favourably by gay and lesbian activists who were outraged at the
possibility of not being able to ―marry‖ one another, but only being
accorded a ―separate but equal‖ status instead.36 On the other side, public
hearings held in consequence of this Bill led the Chairperson of the
Home Affairs Portfolio Committee to conclude that ―[t]he public was
generally opposed to same sex marriages.‖37 Nevertheless, the
Legislature persisted, and somehow succeeded in tabling a second
greatly reduced and (at least prima facie) simplified bill for debate in the
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces on November
14 and 28, 2006, respectively. After being signed by the Deputy
President of the Republic, the Civil Union Act came into operation on
November 30, 2006—exactly one day before the Constitutional Court‘s
order would have taken effect.
C. The Civil Union Act 17 of 2006
The Civil Union Act defines a ―civil union‖ as ―the voluntary union
of two persons who are both 18 years of age or older, which is
solemnised and registered by way of either a marriage or a civil
partnership, in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this Act, to

34. Civil Union Bill, 2006, Bill 26-2006 (GG) (S. Afr.).
35. Id. § 1, 4(1), 18(1).
36. Janine du Plessis, Gay Activists See Red Over Civil Union Bill, PRETORIA NEWS, Oct. 18,
2006, at 3, available at http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=14&click_id=6&art_id=
vn20061018030414526C988603.
37. See Home Affairs Portfolio Committee, Civil Union Bill [B26-2006]: Deliberations, Oct.
31, 2006, http://www.pmg.org.za/node/8431 (last visited May 16, 2008).
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the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others . . . .‖38 This definition makes
provision for the solemnization of a ―civil union‖ which may take the
form of either a marriage or a civil partnership.39 ―Civil union partner‖ is
defined as ―a spouse in a marriage or a partner in a civil partnership, as
the case may be, concluded in terms of this Act . . . .‖40
From the above definitions it becomes clear that the Civil Union Act
provides for two persons of the same sex to marry one another, and to be
referred to as each other‘s spouses. It therefore appears that the term
―civil union‖ is merely semantic and that it has simply been employed to
facilitate the distinction between marriage and civil partnership. Readers
of the Civil Union Act should take care not to conflate the term ―civil
union‖ with similar institutions provided in other jurisdictions, where
concepts of ―marriage‖ and ―civil union‖ have distinct and separate
meanings.41
Three pieces of legislation currently govern marriage in terms of
South African law. Civil marriage is currently available in terms of two
Acts of Parliament, namely the Marriage Act (which only provides for
heterosexual civil marriage) and the Civil Union Act. However, as will
be seen below, uncertainty prevails as to the precise scope and ambit of
the Civil Union Act. As discussed in Part II.A, the Customary Marriages
Act allows parties to marry in terms of customary law. A customary
marriage that complies with the provisions of the Civil Union Act is fully
valid and equal in status to a civil marriage. Parties to such a marriage
may conclude a civil marriage with each other provided that neither of
them is also a party to a customary marriage with a third party.42
Section 13 regulates the legal consequences of the conclusion of a
civil union:
(1) The legal consequences of a marriage contemplated in the Marriage
Act apply, with such changes as may be required by the context, to a
civil union.
(2) [A]ny reference to38. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 1 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
39. ―Civil union‖ is defined in section 1 of the Act; however, ―civil partnership‖ is not
defined.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. For example, in the United States of America the state of Vermont recognizes the validity
of civil unions which are defined as meaning ―that two eligible persons have established a
relationship pursuant to this chapter, and may receive the benefits and protections and be subject to
the responsibilities of spouses.‖ VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (1999). Section 1202 also requires
that parties to a civil union ―be of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of
this state.‖ § 1202 (emphasis added). The United Kingdom Civil Partnership Act, 2004 allows for
same-sex couples to conclude ―civil partnerships‖ which are not referred to as ―marriages.‖
42. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 § 3(2), 10(1), 10(4) (S. Afr).
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(a) marriage in any other law, . . . includes . . . a civil union; and
(b) husband, wife or spouse in any other law, . . . includes a civil union
43
partner.

It is important to note that South African law requires persons who
want to secure legal recognition of their relationships to act proactively
by either concluding a civil marriage, or, in apposite circumstances,
concluding a customary marriage or a civil union. If the latter option is
chosen, the parties are required to take the proactive step of concluding a
registered civil union that complies with the requirements and
formalities prescribed by the Civil Union Act before they can be assured
of securing full legal recognition of their civil union. Failure to secure
full legal recognition will result in the parties being regarded as mere
cohabitants and the differentiation encountered between marriage and
cohabitation (as explained in Part II.A supra) will apply.
III. INTERPRETATIVE DIFFICULTIES—WHAT THE MINISTER SAYS DOES
NOT MIRROR WHAT THE CIVIL UNION ACT SAYS44
By way of introduction, it must be stated that the Civil Union Act is
fraught with interpretative difficulties.45 One of the most glaring of these
pertains to the scope and ambit of the Act in that, although there can be
no doubt that the Act provides for persons of the same sex to conclude a
civil union, the wording of the Civil Union Act is unclear as to whether
persons of the opposite sex may do the same.
The answer to this question may not be of paramount importance as
far as marriage is concerned, as the Marriage Act was not repealed by
the Civil Union Act and is therefore still available to heterosexual
couples. While heterosexual persons may therefore have little or no
practical need for concluding a civil union in the form of marriage, the
discussion in Part II.A shows that the same cannot be said regarding the
conclusion of a heterosexual civil union in the form of a civil
partnership—as the Civil Union Act is currently the only legislative
vehicle by which cohabitants (who do not wish to marry one another)
may secure comprehensive legal recognition of their relationships.
Prior to the adoption of the Bill in the National Assembly on
43. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 13 (S. Afr.).
44. See generally Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 1 A–D.
45. See, e.g., L. Neil van Schalkwyk, Kommentaar op die “Civil Union Act” 17 van 2006, 40
DE JURE 166, 168, 172 (2007). Van Schalkwyk states that the extent to which the Civil Union Act
provides for ―customary‖ civil unions is unclear. The author is of the opinion that the Act provides
for two types of civil union, i.e., in terms of both civil law and customary law (which he describes as
‗―civil‘ civil unions‖ and ‗―customary‘ civil unions‖ respectively).
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November 14, 2006,46 the South African Minister of Home Affairs
remarked that ―[a]s noted in the memorandum on the objects of the Bill,
this Bill makes provision for opposite- and same-sex couples of 18 years
or older to solemnise and register a voluntary union by way of either a
marriage or a civil partnership.‖47 Despite what the Minister says, the
following observations about the Civil Union Act show that oppositeand same-sex couples are, in fact, treated differently under it.
First, not one single provision of the Civil Union Act contains any
reference whatsoever to persons of the opposite sex. Sex is mentioned in
sections 6 and 8(6), but these references are to same-sex couples only.48
Second, section 8(6) of the Civil Union Act states that ―[a] civil
union may only be registered by prospective civil union partners who
would, apart from the fact that they are of the same sex, not be
prohibited by law from concluding a marriage under the Marriage Act or
Customary Marriages Act.‖49 Section 8(6) creates the impression that the
Act only provides for persons of the same sex to conclude a civil
union—if the Act had indeed envisioned civil unions between
heterosexual couples this provision of the Act should have included
wording such as ―apart from the fact that they may be of the same sex.‖50
Third, the preamble to the Civil Union Act51 only refers to the
necessity of providing legal protection for same-sex couples and does not
contain a single reference to persons of the opposite sex.52

46. Civil Union Bill B26-2006: Adoption by the H. Affairs Portfolio Comm. appendix (Nov.
9, 2006), available at http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=8509; see also Same-sex Bill gets
Parliament go-ahead, MAIL AND GUARDIAN ONLINE, November 14, 2006, http://www.mg.co.za
/articlePage.aspx?articleid=289936&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__national/.
47. Introductory remarks by the Hon. NN Mapisa-Nqakula on the occasion of the Second
Reading Debate on the Civil Union Bill (Nov 14, 2006), available at http://home-affairs.pwv.gov.za
/speeches.asp?id=181 (emphasis added).
48. Section 6 states that ―[a] marriage officer, other than a marriage officer referred to in
section 5 [a minister of religion or person attached to a religious denomination or organisation who
has been designated as a marriage officer in terms of this Act], may in writing inform the Minister
that he or she objects on the ground of conscience, religion and belief to solemnising a civil union
between persons of the same sex, whereupon that marriage officer shall not be compelled to
solemnise such civil union.‖ Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 6 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
49. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 8(6) (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
50. Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 1.C.
51. Since 1994 the preambles to South African legislation have often been used by the Courts
as an interpretative tool. See, e.g., Nat‘l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO and
Others 2002 (4) SA 843 (CC) ¶ 14 (S. Afr.); Nat‘l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v RO Cook Props. (Pty)
Ltd 2004 (2) All SA 491 (SCA) ¶ 6 (S. Afr.); Nat‘l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v Parker 2006 (3) SA
198 (SCA) ¶ 1 n.4 (S. Afr.).
52. The following extract from the preamble highlights this point: ―[T]he family law
dispensation as it existed after the commencement of the Constitution did not provide for same-sex
couples to enjoy the status and the benefits coupled with the responsibilities that marriage accords to
opposite-sex couples . . . .‖ Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 pmbl. (S. Afr.) (emphasis added); see also
Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 1.D.
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Fourth, it is submitted that the section 1 definition of a civil union as
being a ―union of two persons‖ does also not necessarily imply that
heterosexual persons are included within the ambit of the Act—when
viewed in the light of points (i)–(iii) above it might be argued that the
reference to ―two persons‖ was inserted in order to provide for intersexed
or transgender persons. Indeed, such persons may have been excluded if
the Act had in fact defined a civil union as being between ―two persons
of the same sex.‖53
Fifth, despite the Minister‘s reference to the ―memorandum on the
objects of the Bill,‖ the fact is that this memorandum does not form part
of the official legislative text of the Act. Persons who obtain a copy of
the Civil Union Act therefore do not also automatically gain access to the
memorandum to which the Minister refers. The suggestion that the
memorandum provides adequate guidance as to the scope of the Act is
therefore not convincing.54
Sixth, it is submitted that the saving grace of the Civil Union Act is
found in section 39(2) of the Constitution of 1996 which requires all
legislation to be interpreted to ―promote the spirit, purport and objects of
the Bill of Rights.‖55 This section might be interpreted to include
heterosexual civil unions. However, the very need for interpretation
about such an important issue creates unnecessary uncertainty; a
situation that will prevail until this issue is clarified by the courts.56
The question now presented is whether the Civil Union Act has been
drafted to enable the average South African citizen or official to
understand what is expected of him or her. In light of the above
discussion it is submitted that it has not, and that the Legislature has
fallen foul of its ―duty to pass legislation that is reasonably clear and
precise, enabling citizens to understand what is expected of them.‖57

53. See Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 1.D.
54. Id. at 1.A.
55. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(c) (―When interpreting any legislation, and when developing
the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport
and objects of the Bill of Rights.‖).
56. See Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 1.D.
57. Islamic Unity Convention v Indep. Broad. Auth. 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC) ¶ 40 (S. Afr.).
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IV. ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTY: ANOMALIES CREATED BY THE COURTS
AND PERPETUATED BY THE CIVIL UNION ACT
In the decade that followed the advent of a democratic Constitutional
dispensation in South Africa58 it was expected that greater recognition
would gradually be accorded to marriages that had previously not been
recognized and to other relationships that may or may not have
resembled family units. Using the broad range of powers granted to them
by the Constitution,59 the courts have been the primary mechanism
driving recognition of these relationships. A recent judgment of the
Constitutional Court illustrates this point. ―It is a matter of our
history . . . that [homosexual] relationships have been the subject of
unfair discrimination in the past. However, our Constitution requires that
unfairly discriminatory treatment of such relationships cease.‖60
Consequently, many cases involved requests to the judiciary for one
or more of the personal consequences pertaining to marriage to be
extended to relationships other than marriage. Very often, the petitioners
were homosexual people living together permanently,61 and, in applying
the constitutional principles elucidated above, the courts managed to
adapt family law in such a way as to comply with the values
underpinning the Constitution. However, the courts are limited to the
facts of the dispute placed before them, and they are required to ―decide
no more than what is absolutely necessary for the adjudication of a
case.‖62 Consequently, such judicial pronouncements have sometimes
had the anomalous effect of facilitating better legal protection for
homosexual couples while leaving their heterosexual counterparts out in
the cold.

58. See supra Part I (noting that 27 April 1994 marks the date of the constitutional
dispensation).
59. See S. AFR. CONST. 2006 § 172 (“(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its
power, a court- (a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; . . . . (2)(a) The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or
a court of similar status may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of
Parliament, a provincial Act or any conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional invalidity
has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court.‖) (emphasis added). The Constitution
also states that ―[t]he Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the
inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking
into account the interests of justice.‖ Id. §. 173.
60. Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & Population Dev. 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) ¶ 32 (S. Afr.).
61. See, e.g., Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) (S. Afr.); Nat‘l
Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
62. GEORGE E. DEVENISH, THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 209 (2005).
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A. Anomaly 1: Adoption63
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Union Act, the Constitutional
Court was called to adjudicate the constitutionality of section 17 of the
Child Care Act 74 of 1983 (―Child Care Act‖) in the matter of Du Toit v
Minister of Welfare & Population Development and Others.64 Section 17
of the Child Care Act allowed for adoption in one of four ways: by a
husband and wife jointly; by a widower or widow or unmarried or
divorced person; by a married person whose spouse is the parent of the
child; or by the natural father of a child born out of wedlock.65
Writing for a full Court, Acting Judge Skweyiya held that this
section discriminates unfairly against people living together in a samesex life partnership. The Court also held that to prevent homosexual
cohabitants who were suitable to do so from adopting children would be
in conflict with the principle enunciated in section 28(2) of the
Constitution, which states that ―a child‘s best interests are of paramount
importance in every matter concerning the child.‖66 Lastly, the Court
found that section 17 of the Child Care Act also infringed section
28(1)(b) of the Constitution, which guarantees children the right ―to
family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when
removed from the family environment.‖67
In consequence of the Du Toit decision, homosexual couples are now
allowed to adopt children jointly. However, South African law does not
yet allow heterosexual cohabitants to do the same. This situation will
persist until the ―new‖ Children‘s Act 38 of 2005 is fully operational.
Although 43 of the 315 sections of the Act came into operation on July 1,
2007, section 231 of this Act (which will remedy the situation) has not
yet come into operation.68 Section 231 stipulates that a child may be
adopted jointly by ―a husband and a wife, partners in a permanent
domestic life-partnership or by other persons sharing a common
household and forming a permanent family unit . . . .‖69

63. Adapted from Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 2.B.
64. Du Toit, 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC).
65. Child Care Act 74 of 1983 § 17 (S. Afr.).
66. Du Toit, 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at ¶ 20 (citing the Constitution).
67. Id. Incidentally, the Court interpreted section 28(1)(b) as guaranteeing the right of a child
to a ―loving and stable family life.‖ Id. at ¶ 22.
68. See Proclamation by the State President (GG June 29, 2007), available at
http://search.sabinet.co.za/WebZ/FETCH?sessionid=01-41234-1415151403&recno=1&resultset=1
&format=F&next=law/law_nffull.html&bad=law/law_badfetch.html&&entitytoprecno=1&entitycur
recno=1.
69. Children‘s Act 38 of 2005 § 231 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
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The adoption anomaly also illustrates the importance of determining
whether or not heterosexual couples are competent to conclude civil
unions. If they can conclude civil unions the application of section 13 of
the Civil Union Act to section 17 of the Child Care Act would allow
heterosexual couples to adopt.70 If they are not, the position of
heterosexual couples would become even more unfavourable, in that,
over and above the anomaly that already exists in consequence of the Du
Toit decision, it would imply that the couples would not be entitled to the
application of section 13 of the Civil Union Act and its concomitant
effects.
B. Anomaly 2: Maintenance 71
In Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund, D and C were involved in a
permanent same-sex life partnership.72 The parties had ―married‖ one
another in 1988 by participating in a marriage-like ceremony (that was
obviously null and void at the time) and they had maintained and
supported one another throughout their ―marriage.‖73 D was medically
boarded in 1994 and received a disability pension.74 Because the
disability pension was considerably less than C‘s salary, C in effect
maintained D.75
After C was killed in a motor accident in 1999, D instituted action
against the Road Accident Fund (―RAF‖) for loss of support.76 The Road
Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 requires common law liability before the
RAF can be held statutorily liable for any claim arising from the
negligent driving of a motor vehicle.77 On that basis, the RAF argued that
it could not be held liable for D‘s claim because the common law action
for loss of support did not include persons of the same sex. The RAF
succeeded in the court a quo, but on appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal
found that the extension of the common law sought by the plaintiff could
be accommodated along the lines of legal precedent and, furthermore,
that doing so would satisfy the ―behests of the Constitution.‖78 Having
found the common law deficient, the Court proceeded in terms of section

70. Section 13 of the Civil Union Act requires the words ―husband‖ and ―wife‖ in the Child
Care Act to be interpreted in light of the Civil Union Act.
71. See Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 2.C.
72. Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA) ¶¶ 1, 3 (S. Afr.).
73. Id. at ¶ 3.
74. Id. at ¶ 4.
75. Id.
76. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 4.
77. Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 § 19(a) (S. Afr.).
78. Du Plessis, 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA) at ¶¶ 17–34.
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17379 of the Constitution which vests the Supreme Court of Appeal and
the High Courts with the inherent power to develop the common law. It
held as follows:
To extend the action for loss of support to partners in a same-sex
permanent life relationship similar in other respects to marriage, who
had a contractual duty to support one another, would be an
incremental step to ensure that the common law accords with the
dynamic and evolving fabric of our society as reflected in the
80
Constitution . . . .

Cronjé and Heaton summarize the anomalous effect of the Du
Plessis decision by stating that ―even if heterosexual life partners
contractually undertake a duty of support, the surviving heterosexual life
partner does not have a claim for damages for loss of support, while a
surviving same-sex life partner has such a claim.‖ 81
Judicial intervention in the development of marriage-like
relationships since 1994 has focused almost exclusively on same-sex
relationships. However, heterosexual relationships have also been
subjected to close scrutiny. In Robinson and Another v Volks NO the
surviving party to a heterosexual life partnership requested that the Cape
High Court extend certain privileges granted under the Maintenance of
Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 (―Surviving Spouses Act‖) to her. 82
The facts were quite simple: S and R had been involved in a
relationship since 1985.83 They lived together from 1989 until S‘s death
in 2001.84 During this time S supported and maintained R; she was
registered as a dependant on his medical aid scheme and the couple‘s
family and friends accepted them as ―husband and wife‖ despite the fact
that they were never married.85 After S passed away R instituted a claim
against his estate in terms of the Surviving Spouses Act.86 Section 2(1) of
the Surviving Spouses Act states:
If a marriage is dissolved by death after the commencement of this
Act [July 1, 1990] the survivor shall have a claim against the estate
of the deceased spouse for the provision of his reasonable
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See supra note 59.
Du Plessis, 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA) at ¶ 37 (emphasis added).
CRONJÉ & HEATON, supra note 19, at 232.
Robinson and Another v Volks NO, 2004 (6) SA 288 (C) (S. Afr.).
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id. at 290–91.
Id. at 293–94.
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maintenance needs until his death or remarriage in so far as he is
87
not able to provide therefor from his own means and earnings .

The Surviving Spouses Act defines ―survivor‖ as ―the surviving
spouse in a marriage dissolved by death.‖88
R‘s claim was rejected by the executor of S‘s estate, on the basis that
S and R‘s conscious election not to marry reflected ―the choice not to
have the automatic consequences of the laws of marriage appl[ied] to
their relationship.‖89 R then instituted action in the Cape High Court,
where the Surviving Spouses Act was found unconstitutional to the
extent that it did not provide for persons in permanent life partnerships to
receive maintenance from their partners‘ deceased estates.90
As discussed supra, section 172(2) of the Constitution states that a
declaration of unconstitutionality of legislation by a South African Court
has no validity until the order has been confirmed by the Constitutional
Court.91 In what may appear to be a surprising move, the Constitutional
Court refused to confirm the Cape High Court‘s finding.92 The Court
concluded that it would be impossible to interpret the Surviving Spouses
Act so as to include permanent life partnerships as doing so would be
―unduly strained‖ and ―manifestly inconsistent‖ with the ―context and
structure‖ of the wording adopted by the Legislature.93 The Court
emphasized that ―[m]arriage and family are important social institutions
in our society. Marriage has a central and special place, and forms one of
the important bases for family life in our society.‖94 Thus, the Court
concluded that the law could legitimately distinguish between married
and unmarried people.95
Comparing Du Plessis with Volks leads to an anomalous result—
despite the fact that the law did not impose an ex lege duty of support in
either case, it was clear that in both cases the parties had expressly or
implicitly undertaken to maintain each other. Nevertheless, the Court
was prepared to extend the common law to include homosexual domestic
partners in Du Plessis but refused to adapt the law for heterosexual life
87. Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 § 2(1) (emphasis added).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Volks NO, 2004 (6) SA 288 (C) at 291.
90. Id. at 302.
91. S. AFR. CONST. 2006 § 172(2)(a).
92. Volks NO, 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at ¶ 70.
93. Id. at ¶¶ 40–45.
94. Id. at ¶ 52.
95. See id. at ¶ 54 (―In the context of certain laws there would often be some historical and
logical justification for discriminating between married and unmarried persons and the protection of
the institution of marriage is a legitimate area for the law to concern itself with.‖ (quoting Fraser v
Children‘s Court, Pretoria North, and Others 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) ¶ 26 (S. Afr.))).
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partners in Volks.
It is noteworthy of mentioning that the issues before the Courts in Du
Plessis and Volks also serve to highlight the impact of the Civil Union
Act. This is because section 13 of the Act: (i) will have the immediate
effect of extending the common law action for loss of support to civil
union partners; and (ii) will also have the effect of entitling a civil union
partner to claim maintenance from his or her deceased partner‘s estate.
It should be clear that the impact of section 13 once again highlights
the importance of clarifying the issue as to whether or not the Civil
Union Act provides for heterosexual civil unions. Notwithstanding the
impact of section 13, the harsh reality remains that the Du Plessis case
entitles same-sex life partnerships to claim for loss of support without
having to take the proactive step of concluding a civil union. On the
other hand, their heterosexual counterparts find themselves in a far less
comfortable position.
C. Anomaly 3: Intestate succession 96
The Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 (―Intestate Succession Act‖)
provides the surviving spouse and children of a person who dies either
entirely or partially intestate to inherit the intestate portion of the estate.97
Originally the Intestate Succession Act only catered to spouses who had
concluded a valid civil marriage that had been solemnized and registered
in accordance with the Marriage Act.98 However, the advent of a human
rights culture has necessitated a more inclusive and pluralistic approach
towards intestate succession in South Africa. In this regard, the following
three developments have recently occurred:
(1) Islamic marriages: Islamic marriages that have not been
solemnized in accordance with the civil marriage laws of South Africa
are not generally regarded as valid marriages.99 However, in consequence
of the 2004 decision in Daniels v Campbell, the surviving spouse of a
monogamous Islamic marriage now qualifies as a ―spouse‖ for the
purposes of the Intestate Succession Act and can therefore inherit

96. Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 2.D.
97. Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 § 1(1)(a)–(c) (S. Afr.).
98. Gory v Kolver NO and Others 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) ¶¶ 1, 19 (S. Afr.); Daniels v
Campbell 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC) ¶¶ 2, 3, 19 (S. Afr.).
99. Although such marriages are therefore invalid, they have, from time to time, been
recognized under specific legislation such as the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 § 1 (S. Afr.),
where ―domestic relationship‖ is defined as ―including marriage according to any law, custom or
religion,‖ and the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 § 195(2) (S. Afr.). The Courts have also held
that effect can be given to a de facto monogamous (purely religious) Islamic marriage. See Ryland v
Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (CC) at 707 (E/F)–(H); 709 (C/D)–(E) and 711 (C) (S. Afr.).
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intestate.100
(2) Customary marriages: In Bhe and Others v Magistrate,
Khayelitsha, and Others, the Constitutional Court found the principle of
male primogeniture (according to which customary law of succession has
traditionally taken place) to be unconstitutional.101 It was held that the
Intestate Succession Act would henceforth apply to both monogamous
and polygamous customary marriages.102
(3) Homosexual life partners: In Gory v Kolver NO and Others the
Constitutional Court recently held that the failure of the Intestate
Succession Act to allow for permanent same-sex cohabitants to inherit
intestate from one another was unconstitutional.103 The Court did,
however, add a qualification to its order by requiring that such
cohabitants must have undertaken reciprocal duties of support before
they would be able to inherit in this fashion. 104
The upshot of the developments elucidated above is that the Intestate
Succession Act currently applies to most marriage and marriage-like
institutions encountered in South Africa. However, there is one important
exception—heterosexual life partners are not included within the ambit
of the Intestate Succession Act, irrespective of whether or not they have
undertaken to maintain one another. Once again, this state of affairs
amply illustrates the importance of clarifying whether or not the Civil
Union Act allows for the conclusion of heterosexual civil unions. If it
does, section 13 of the Intestate Succession Act will automatically allow
the parties to such a union to inherit intestate and the only differentiation
encountered would be that heterosexual cohabitants who are either
unmarried or who have not concluded a civil union would not be allowed
to inherit intestate (while their same-sex counterparts who had
undertaken to maintain one another would, in light of the Gory case, be
able to do so). However, should the Civil Union Act not provide for
heterosexual civil unions to be included, the differentiation would be
encountered on not one but two fronts as (i) the exclusion of heterosexual
civil unions would obviously imply that section 13 of the Civil Union
Act could not be applied to the Intestate Succession Act, and (ii)
heterosexual couples also would not qualify for the protection provided
by the Gory case as the case only applies to homosexual couples.

100.
101.
Afr.).
102.
103.
104.

Daniels v Campbell, 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) 350-51 (S. Afr.).
Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) 581 (S.
Id.
Gory v Kolver NO and Others 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) ¶ 66 (S. Afr.).
Id.
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V. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL UNION ACT
The passing of a Bill of Rights that included an express prohibition
of unfair discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, coupled
with a Constitutional Court that made it abundantly clear that its task was
to uphold the Constitution even if it conflicted with the public opinion of
the majority of South Africans,105 made the recognition of same-sex
marriage almost inevitable.
When viewed against the backdrop of post-1994 developments in
South Africa, the fact that the impetus for this development was provided
by the judiciary and not the legislature comes as no surprise. Having said
this, one important aspect of the Fourie case cannot be overlooked—that
the Constitutional Court was mindful of its function to state the law and
not to make it.
This judgment serves to vindicate the rights of the applicants by
declaring the manner in which the law at present fails to meet their
equality claims. At the same time, it is my view that it would best serve
those equality claims by respecting the separation of powers and giving
106
Parliament an opportunity to deal appropriately with the matter.

One of the reasons for opting to give the legislature the task of
ironing out the intricacies of same-sex marriage recognition was that
substantial research regarding the question of same-sex marriage and the
possibility of providing for marriage-like relationships in the form of
domestic partnerships had already been conducted by the South African
Law Reform Commission, to such an extent that the Commission ―ha[d]
reached a position to produce draft legislation.‖107 The Commission‘s
Report on Domestic Partnerships was the product of almost a decade of
research, in which comprehensive proposals were contained for dealing
with marriage (both same- and opposite-sex), and both registered and
unregistered partnerships.108
105. S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 394–95 (S. Afr.) (―Public opinion
may have some relevance to the enquiry, but, in itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in the
Courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions without fear or favour. If public
opinion were to be decisive, there would be no need for constitutional adjudication. The protection
of rights could then be left to Parliament, which has a mandate from the public, and is answerable to
the public for the way its mandate is exercised, but this would be a return to parliamentary
sovereignty, and a retreat from the new legal order established by the 1993 Constitution.‖).
106. Minister of Home Affairs and Another v. Fourie and Another 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) ¶
139 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
107. Id. at ¶ 129.
108. See SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 13, at xi–xvi (summarizing
the Commission‘s proposals).
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Despite the Court‘s order and the Commission‘s report, the
legislature did not appear to be in too much of a hurry to give effect to
the Constitutional Court‘s order. Indeed, the first Bill that was published
in the Government Gazette appeared on August 31, 2006, a mere three
months before the deadline of November 30.109 This Bill was followed
by a second Bill that was introduced to the Home Affairs Portfolio
Committee on November 8, 2006.110 Nevertheless, this second Bill was
adopted by the Portfolio Committee and was sent to the National
Assembly where it was debated, voted on, and passed on November
14—approximately one week after having first been tabled to the
Portfolio Committee.111
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite being in a position to consider (and give effect to) the South
African Law Reform Commission‘s research, the Civil Union Act that
came into operation on November 30, 2006, makes it clear that
Parliament did not do so. Instead, the legislation is poorly-drafted and is
replete with inconsistencies. Just one example is the fact that the Civil
Union Act makes provision for the conclusion of a so-called ―civil
partnership.‖112 On November 8, 2006, the Home Affairs Portfolio
Committee agreed with a proposal by the African National Congress to
the effect that all references to ―domestic partnerships‖ in the original
Bill should be removed and that this issue should be dealt with in
separate legislation.113 However, this proposal was clearly disregarded in
the final bill. The new Bill (as adopted by the Portfolio Committee the
very next day and which would be promulgated as the Civil Union Act a
mere three weeks later) did in fact make provision for civil partnerships
notwithstanding the original decision to deal with alternatives to
marriage in future separate legislation. 114

109. Civil Union Bill, 2006, Bill 26-2006 (GG) (S. Afr.).
110. Civil Union Bill B26-2006: Deliberations on B26-2006 and B26B-2006 Before the H.
Affairs Portfolio Comm. (Nov. 8, 2006), http://www.pmg.org.za/node/8504 (last visited May 17,
2008).
111. Civil Union Bill B26-2006: Adoption by the H. Affairs Portfolio Comm. (Nov. 9, 2006),
http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=8509. This was not the final step in the process as the
National Council of Provinces also had to vote on the Bill. Although the vote occurred two weeks
later, the National Council of Provinces vote was described as ―largely a formality‖ after which the
Bill would be ―rubberstamped by President Thabo Mbeki.‖ Green Light for Gay Marriages,
IAFRICA.COM, Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.iafrica.com/news/sa/416904.htm.
112. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 1 (S. Afr.).
113. Civil Union Bill, supra note 110.
114. Civil Union Bill, 2006, Bill 26B-2006 (GG) § 1 (S. Afr.).
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When all is said and done it becomes clear that the Fourie case
involved something more than the sole issue of legalizing same-sex
marriage. In his majority judgment, Sachs J stated that ―whatever
legislative remedy is chosen must be as generous and accepting towards
same-sex couples as it is to heterosexual couples, both in terms of the
intangibles as well as the tangibles involved.‖115
The anomalies explained above highlight the fact that the drafters of
the Civil Union Act paid mere lip service to this guideline, and, in so
doing, promulgated legislation that has perpetuated the almost absurd
situation of having a legal system that provides gay couples with far
more comprehensive legal protection than their heterosexual
counterparts.
In conclusion, it must be mentioned that the Civil Union Act has
been described as an interim measure by the South African Minister of
Home Affairs,116 and it is envisioned that South African matrimonial law
may receive a complete overhaul in the near future. Nevertheless, the
fact remains that the Civil Union Act has left many questions
unanswered—a fact which will certainly make both the legislature and
the judiciary‘s future tasks even more arduous and which poses further
challenging questions for the fledgling democracy to answer.

115. Minister of Home Affairs and Another v. Fourie and Another 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) ¶
153 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
116. Mapisa-Nqakula Vouches for Same-Sex Marriages, SABC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2006,
http://www.sabcnews.com/south_africa/social/0,2172,139205,00.html.

